was tlaen at and near Manassas Junction. It was supposed by General McCIellan to be 102,500 strong, and Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley was believed to have 13,000 more.[1] These figures, it is true, were more than twice as large as the facts warranted ; Johnston had only 47,096 men, including those on the lower Potomac; Jackson's force numbered only 10,2411[2]; but no one in Washington seems to have suspected the truth. The estimate of General McCIellan appears to have been believed not only by him, but by the President and Secretary of War.[3] Hence, it could not be expected that the Administration could see without alarm the departure of its main army for parts unknown, while the victor of Bull Eun with a hundred thousand men at his back was within thirty miles of the capital.[4] Every one conceded that the safety of Washington was a matter of paramount importance ; but this was necessarily more strongly felt by the President than by the General-in-chief, whose principal anxiety was to secure for the operations of his army the field of his choice.

The subject of the line of advance of the Army of the Potomac was, therefore, fairly before the

[1] McClellan's Report, 5 W. R., 53; Reports of Allen Pinkerton, chief of the Secret Service Corps, *ib.*, 736, 763. General McCIellan assumed Pink-

erton's figures to be correct.

[3] Johnston's *Narrative*, 84. [3] Webb, 26.

* It has also been asserted on good authority (Swinton, 86) that the President's opinion, that an advance on Manassas could be undertaken before a movement to the lower Chesapeake could be begun, influenced him against McClellan's plan ; but it seems far more probable that the great difficulty with McClellan's scheme in Mr. Lincoln's mind from the very first was that it jeopardized the safety of the capital.